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Justice
Tweet
Psychological science on claiming discrimination identifies 
opportunities to improve the promise of civil rights 
enforcement.
Key Points
•• Employment discrimination claimants have difficulty 
obtaining legal representation.
•• Legal representation is critical for receiving meaning-
ful redress for civil rights violations.
•• Psychological processes and structural barriers com-
bine to diminish discrimination claimants’ access to 
counsel.
•• This analysis identifies how to improve the promise of 
civil rights enforcement.
Introduction
This year, the United States marks the 50th anniversary of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VII of this act outlawed 
many forms of employment discrimination and created the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to 
guide victims of employment discrimination toward access-
ing their rights. Despite the significant strides made in access 
to workplace civil rights in the ensuing 50 years, the promise 
of Title VII remains largely unfulfilled for many victims of 
employment discrimination. This article explores psycho-
logical science on claiming discrimination, examining the 
barriers that prevent victims of employment discrimination 
from achieving meaningful redress and access to justice. We 
focus on the process of obtaining legal representation. 
Accessing counsel is critical in the dispute pyramid, which 
largely dictates whether a claimant will vindicate unlawful 
discrimination, and as yet, is underexplored by psychologi-
cal inquiry.
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Abstract
Employment discrimination claimants in general, and racial minority claimants in particular, disproportionately lack access 
to legal counsel. When employment discrimination claimants lack counsel, they typically abandon their claims, or if they 
pursue their claims, they do so pro se (without counsel), a strategy that is seldom successful in court. Access to counsel is, 
hence, a decisive component in whether employment discrimination victims realize the potential of civil rights enforcement. 
Psychological science analyzes access to counsel by identifying psychological barriers—such as threatened social identity, 
mistrust in legal authorities, and fear of repercussions—that prevent employment discrimination victims from pursuing 
counsel. The analysis also identifies how cultural beliefs and practices concerning justice—such as meritocracy beliefs, 
perceived post-racialism, and organizational diversity initiatives—shape how judges, jurors, and lay people think about 
discrimination. Furthermore, counsels’ perceptions of other’s beliefs about discrimination shape their assessed likelihood 
of prevailing. These psychological barriers intersect with structural barriers to shape counsels’ evaluation of each case’s 
likely financial viability, which can prevent counsel from accepting cases that they otherwise deem meritorious. Policy can 
help those who experience employment discrimination obtain legal representation and meaningful redress for civil rights 
violations.
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employment discrimination, discrimination claims, legal representation, social justice, legitimacy, civil rights, postracial, 
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Dispute Pyramid
Analyzing how experiences of discrimination become legal 
cases, Miller and Sarat’s (1980) Pyramid of Disputes high-
lights where grievances fall out of the legal system (Galanter, 
1983). Grievances reside at the pyramid’s broadest point, the 
base. Grievances are convictions of being unjustly treated. 
When individuals experience a grievance, they can scale up 
to the next level of the pyramid by making a claim for redress 
or they can fall from the pyramid by choosing not to pursue 
the grievance. Claims can be either accepted as legitimate by 
the other party (and the claimant receives redress) or they 
can be contested, and move up another level in the pyramid 
to become a dispute. The claimant can then choose either to 
abandon the dispute or to bring it to a lawyer. If the lawyer 
chooses to represent the claimant, the dispute ascends the 
pyramid. If the lawyer turns down the case, the dispute typi-
cally falls off the pyramid, or it can remain, but as a pro se 
case, whereby the claimant forgoes counsel.
Compared with other kinds of grievances, discrimination-
related grievances have steep attrition from the pyramid, dis-
proportionately falling out of the legal system at all levels of 
the pyramid (Miller & Sarat, 1980). Another dispute pyramid 
analysis reached a similar conclusion, estimating that only 
1% of African Americans’ discrimination-related grievances 
ultimately become lawsuits (Nielsen & Nelson, 2005). To be 
sure, the dispute pyramid is steeper for discrimination-related 
grievances than other grievances, but why?
Psychological science has focused almost exclusively on 
the grievance and claim stages of the dispute pyramid, iden-
tifying psychological barriers that prevent people from per-
ceiving and asserting discrimination-related grievances 
(Kaiser & Major, 2006; Major & Kaiser, 2005). Here, we 
investigate the psychology of what happens after victims 
perceive and publicly assert discrimination-related griev-
ances and then attempt to obtain legal counsel. Specifically, 
discrimination claimants are disproportionately likely to end 
up without legal counsel, so we examine why this occurs. 
Given that individuals who file pro se legal cases fare far 
worse than counseled claimants (Berger, Finkelstein, & 
Cheung, 2005; Miller & Sarat, 1980; Quintanilla, 2011), this 
lack of legal representation poses an access-to-justice prob-
lem, preventing discrimination claimants from ascending the 
pyramid of disputes and obtaining meaningful redress for 
civil rights violations (Nielsen, Nelson, & Lancaster, 2010).
Plaintiffs’ Counsel as Civil Rights 
Gatekeepers
To obtain legal representation, an individual must convince a 
lawyer that the case is legitimate and that legal decision mak-
ers will perceive the case as meritorious. Many who cannot 
obtain representation exit the dispute pyramid without mean-
ingful redress. Yet, a fraction forges ahead and files a case pro 
se. Analyses of 25 years of federal employment discrimination 
cases reveal that compared with other disputes, many employ-
ment discrimination plaintiffs file legal cases without legal 
representation (20%), as pro se plaintiffs (Myrick, Nelson, & 
Nielsen, 2012). Although the Administrative Office of U.S. 
Courts reports that the uncounseled rate in U.S. federal district 
courts across all civil cases (excluding prisoner petitions) is 
10.9%, our own review of federal employment discrimination 
cases within Bloomberg Law’s database reveals that of the 
12,619 employment discrimination cases filed in 2013, 24.1% 
were filed pro se. Furthermore, pro se status shows racial dis-
parities, with African Americans, Hispanic Americans, and 
Asian Americans less likely than Whites to obtain representa-
tion (Myrick et al., 2012). These disparities persist even con-
trolling for plaintiffs’ occupational status, gender, age, type of 
discrimination, and EEOC assessment of the case’s strength 
(Myrick et al., 2012). Thus, the very groups most likely to 
experience discrimination are least likely to receive legal rep-
resentation, a structural impediment within our system of civil 
rights protections that operates against those most in need of 
equal employment opportunity.
Both the high rate of pro se representation in discrimina-
tion cases and the racial disparities in pro se filing pose an 
access-to-justice problem. Among claimants who reach dis-
positive motion litigation stages, those who advance pro se 
almost invariably lose (Berger et al., 2005; Nielsen et al., 
2010; Quintanilla, 2011). As such, plaintiffs’ lawyers are 
civil rights gatekeepers who control meaningful access to the 
rights and remedies that the law provides (Albiston & 
Nielsen, 2006).
This article offers a three-stage analysis, examining how 
psychological factors related to employment-discrimination 
victims, lawyers, and their interaction shape legal represen-
tation outcomes. The three stages involve the following: (a) 
the employment-discrimination claimant’s decision to seek 
counsel; (b) counsel’s initial assessment of the potential cli-
ent’s claim; and (c) counsel’s assessment of whether others 
(e.g., judges, juries, defense counsel) will deem the claim 
meritorious, coupled with an evaluation of the claim’s finan-
cial viability. The analysis highlights how psychological pro-
cesses shape discrimination claimants’ experiences with the 
legal system and lawyers’ decisions about whether to repre-
sent them. The analysis also connects legal decisions to 
structural factors and underlying psychological processes, 
considering law and policy relevant to increasing the likeli-
hood that those who face unlawful discrimination will obtain 
legal representation and, in turn, meaningful redress.
Stage I: Pursuing Counsel
After navigating organizational dispute procedures and fed-
eral channels, those aggrieved by unlawful discrimination 
are responsible for identifying counsel to consider their case. 
Yet, this is when a significant proportion of employment dis-
crimination cases fall from the dispute pyramid (Nielsen & 
Nelson, 2005). Why would people who acknowledged 
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discrimination within their organization or received a 
Notification of the Right to Sue Letter from the EEOC be 
reluctant to speak with a lawyer?
Psychological Barriers
Costs of claiming discrimination. Some claimants may hesitate 
to confer with counsel because of the interpersonal costs of 
claiming discrimination. Although most people believe that 
they will speak up when they experience discrimination, in 
fact, few do (Shelton & Stewart, 2004; Swim & Hyers, 1999; 
Woodzicka & LaFrance, 2001). Victims report being reluc-
tant to speak about their experiences of discrimination 
because they anticipate that others will react negatively (Kai-
ser & Miller, 2004). These concerns are understandable, as 
members of high-status groups often do respond negatively 
toward those claiming discrimination, even when claims are 
warranted (Kaiser, Dyrenforth, & Hagiwara, 2006; Kaiser & 
Miller, 2001; Shelton & Stewart, 2004).
For example, in one experiment (Kaiser & Miller, 2003), 
White participants viewed the job application of an African 
American man who was denied employment. Some partici-
pants saw that the hiring manager made extremely racist 
remarks (e.g., that African Americans are unintelligent and 
that he would never hire an African American), and others 
saw statements that were either subtly racist or race neutral. 
When the job applicant blamed his adverse outcome on rac-
ism, Whites perceived him as a troublemaker, compared with 
when he blamed his experience on other causes. This negative 
reaction occurred even given the employer’s blatant racism.
Interpersonal costs from asserting discrimination are 
likely a barrier to seeking counsel. Even if victims overcome 
the obstacles of filing an internal grievance and an EEOC 
charge, recruiting counsel greatly amplifies the potential 
costs of claiming discrimination, as any lawsuit becomes 
public and the claimant’s credibility becomes central to 
deciding the merits of a case. Anticipating these interper-
sonal costs (from defense attorneys, juries, judges, media, 
coworkers) may make victims’ discrimination forgo seeking 
counsel, abandoning their claims.
Trust in legal authorities. The decision to seek counsel may 
also be shaped by expectations of how fairly one anticipates 
being treated by the legal system (Tyler, 2006). If people 
anticipate encountering unfair legal procedures, they are less 
likely to turn to the legal system to resolve their grievances. 
Victims of employment discrimination need to believe that 
they will experience procedural fairness (Tyler, 2006)—
treatment as procedurally fair as the employer they are 
suing—and that the court will behave unbiasedly toward 
them. For some disadvantaged groups, their long-standing 
history of mistreatment and disenfranchisement in the legal 
system undermines faith in the fairness of the legal system 
(Tyler, 2006). This may cause them to abandon their claims, 
or to exert more personal control over their predicament by 
forgoing counsel and representing themselves.
Structural Barriers
Besides psychological barriers, structural barriers dampen 
and prevent seeking counsel. First, because discrimination 
claimants are overrepresented among society’s marginal-
ized segments, they may have fewer resources to retain a 
lawyer, or to absorb lawyers’ fees should they lose, and 
might instead choose to pursue cases as pro se plaintiffs or 
to abandon their claims (Myrick et al., 2012). Second, 
because people tend to live and work with others of the 
same social class, many victims of discrimination may not 
have social networks that connect to sympathetic lawyers, 
offering fewer opportunities to obtain legal representation 
(Myrick et al., 2012). Last, claimants from society’s mar-
gins unduly lack the access, ability, and means to identify 
and hire counsel.
Stage II: Gaining Credibility in the Eyes 
of Plaintiffs’ Counsel
If employment discrimination claimants pass these psycho-
logical and structural barriers to seeking counsel, they then 
describe their experiences to plaintiffs’ counsel, who consid-
ers the credibility of their account. Here, psychological pro-
cesses that characterize potential client–lawyer discussions 
about discrimination can affect initial assessment of the 
potential client’s credibility.
Psychological Barriers
Social identity threat. Discussing experiences of discrimina-
tion is stressful, especially when the conversation occurs 
between individuals whose groups differ in social status 
(Richeson & Shelton, 2007). Such discussions can lead to a 
predicament known as “social identity threat,” the concern 
with being viewed through the lens of stereotypes or being 
devalued because of group membership (Steele, Spencer, & 
Aronson, 2002). As much research reveals, social identity 
threat results in anxiety, stress, and physiological arousal 
(Major & O’Brien, 2005). Social identity related stress harms 
its targets, undermining test performance, decision making, 
and behavior regulation (Major & O’Brien, 2005; Richeson 
& Shelton, 2007; Steele et al., 2002).
Social identity threat may impair the initial screening 
meetings between employment-discrimination victims and 
lawyers. When disenfranchised potential clients (e.g., 
minority, elderly, female, disabled, or an immigrant) com-
municate with lawyers (often from higher social status), 
they are vulnerable to social identity threat. Social identity 
threat may occur even if the lawyer harbors no animosity 
toward the client: Simply discussing one’s experience with 
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discrimination could induce this threat (Richeson & 
Shelton, 2007).
When a potential client experiences social identity 
threat, the resulting physiological arousal and taxed cogni-
tive capacities may affect their ability to communicate 
clearly with a lawyer. They may, for example, disclose less, 
speak more awkwardly, respond less effectively to ques-
tions, avoid eye contact, or otherwise behave anxiously 
(Burgess, Warren, Phelan, Dovidio, & Van Ryn, 2010). 
Thus, social identity threat may challenge potential clients’ 
ability to discuss their experiences confidently and credi-
bly. When this process unfolds, lawyers may find clients’ 
accounts of discrimination insufficiently compelling, and 
the conversations may weaken interpersonal rapport. This 
psychological phenomenon may hinder discrimination 
cases, and in particular, racial minorities’ cases, from 
ascending the pyramid of disputes.
Fortunately, the potential for social identity threat in 
client–lawyer interactions can be remedied. Lawyers could 
be educated about how social identity threat can impair 
performance in intergroup interactions and could become 
more aware that awkward behavior or weak rapport may 
stem in part from social identity threat, rather than from 
credibility issues with the potential client’s case. Legal 
education could draw on identity-safety research, which 
shows that potentially threatening contexts can improve 
when they convey valuing disadvantaged groups (Steele 
et al., 2002). For example, lawyers’ office space can high-
light past success representing disadvantaged clients, or 
present service to minority-advocacy groups. Furthermore, 
increased diversity of the legal profession can result in 
more lawyers from similar backgrounds to many discrimi-
nation claimants, increasing claimants’ comfort with dis-
cussing discrimination. These welcoming environments 
relax discrimination claimants, improving communication 
with lawyers.
Structural Barriers
Structural barriers also impede employment-discrimination 
victims from convincing attorneys that their cases are cred-
ible. As discrimination claimants often come from disad-
vantaged backgrounds, they may have insufficient status 
within an organization to access information about the his-
tory of their group’s treatment within the organization. This 
could undermine gathering evidence about potential dis-
crimination and result in furnishing lawyers with less con-
vincing evidence. In addition, clients from disadvantaged 
backgrounds might have few personal connections to legal 
professionals in their everyday social networks, and they 
may lack advice on how to hunt for compelling evidence of 
discrimination (e.g., requesting personnel documents, 
maintaining a detailed journal about discriminatory 
experiences).
Stage III: Counsel’s Projection of Legal 
Merit and Financial Viability
For employment discrimination claimants who do convince 
a lawyer that their case is credible, the next obstacle in 
ascending the pyramid of disputes involves the lawyer pro-
jecting the case’s legal merit, as well as its financial viability. 
Because only successful litigation mainly compensates law-
yers, their willingness to represent the claimant must assess 
both likelihood of establishing liability and winning mone-
tary recovery (Farhang & Spencer, 2014). Lawyers derive 
these judgments by predicting how others—juries, judges, 
and defense attorneys—will react to the case, that is, whether 
they will find the claims credible and the victim worthy of 
legal redress. This process involves “meta-perceptions,” 
inferences about how others will perceive the claimant and 
the case (Laing, Phillipson, & Lee, 1966). Lawyers’ meta-
perceptions may derive partly from widespread beliefs that 
shape how both everyday people and legal thinkers under-
stand discrimination. Plaintiffs’ counsel is in a precarious 
position when drawing meta-perceptions because many 
powerful cultural beliefs inhibit legal decision makers and 
lay people from perceiving discrimination directed against 
disadvantaged groups. These shared but inaccurate beliefs 
can pose barriers to successfully litigating discrimination 
cases, perhaps leading lawyers to decline cases that they oth-
erwise see as legitimate.
Psychological Barriers
Meritocracy beliefs. Discrimination claims occur in the con-
text of shared beliefs that the United States is a meritocracy: 
a place where anyone, irrespective of background and cir-
cumstances, can get ahead through hard work, determina-
tion, and talent (Kaiser & Major, 2006). The more strongly 
individuals endorse meritocracy, or the more the situation 
makes those beliefs salient, the less likely they are to detect 
discrimination against members of disadvantaged groups, 
such as minorities and women (Major, Quinton, & McCoy, 
2002). Furthermore, the more people endorse meritocracy, 
the more they derogate minorities who air discrimination 
grievances (Kaiser et al., 2006; Schultz & Maddox, 2013). 
Discrimination against minorities threatens a core meritoc-
racy belief that anyone in the United States can succeed if he 
or she simply works hard enough. Rather than abandoning 
meritocracy beliefs, people often preserve them by denying 
discrimination and rejecting those who challenge their 
beliefs (Kaiser & Major, 2006).
Faced with this cultural backdrop about meritocracy, 
plaintiffs’ counsel may experience a dilemma between their 
personal conviction that a potential client experienced dis-
crimination and their meta-perception of how others will 
view the case. Thus, they may decline cases that they person-
ally deem credible. They may instead selectively choose 
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cases that are likely to overcome cultural perceptions that the 
workplace is a meritocracy. For example, they may be more 
willing to pursue collective cases that involve an aggrieved 
class of claimants (Nielsen et al., 2010), rather than a single 
individual: Attributing a single person’s misfortune to lack of 
merit is easier than doing so for an entire class of aggrieved 
people (Crosby, Clayton, Alksnis, & Hemker, 1986).
Post-racialism. Discrimination claims also occur in the con-
text of a cultural belief that the United States has achieved a 
phase of post-racialism, a period in which racism no longer 
poses serious problems for minorities (Norton & Sommers, 
2011). When people perceive the United States as post-racial, 
minorities’ discrimination claims appear less credible, and 
people question whether efforts to address discrimination are 
still necessary (Kaiser, Drury, Spalding, Cheryan, & O’Brien, 
2009; Plaut, 2011). Post-racialism allows meritocracy beliefs 
to flourish, as this climate communicates that past barriers no 
longer remain.
Furthermore, post-racialism beliefs shape which groups 
seem most affected by discrimination (Wilkins & Kaiser, 
2014). For example, recent U.S. Supreme Court cases dis-
missing both affirmative action and disparate impact theory 
cited a substantial decline in the racism faced by disadvan-
taged groups (Grutter v. Bollinger, 2003; Ricci v. DeStefano, 
2009; Fisher v. University of Texas, 2013). At the same time, 
they characterized efforts to address remaining societal rac-
ism against minority groups as deliberate “reverse discrimi-
nation” against Whites. Over time, these cultural shifts have 
resulted in many Whites now perceiving that Whites, rather 
than minorities, are more likely to be the targets of race dis-
crimination (Norton & Sommers, 2011).
The cultural climate of post-racialism poses a barrier for 
plaintiffs’ counsel. If judges and juries now believe that rac-
ism against disadvantaged groups is disappearing, plaintiffs’ 
counsel will have greater difficulty convincing them that 
minority clients’ cases are credible. Indeed, a recent analysis 
of judges’ summary judgment decisions in federal discrimi-
nation cases revealed that Black claimants’ race discrimina-
tion claims were more likely to be dismissed than those of 
White claimants, and that the race of the judge exacerbates 
this effect (Nielsen et al., 2010; Weinberg & Nielsen, 2011). 
A similar pattern emerges at the motion-to-dismiss stage, 
under the new pleading standard that instructs judges to draw 
on their own experience and common sense when screening 
cases (Quintanilla, 2011). These patterns may emerge 
because judges’ intuitions are shaped by participating in a 
culture that believes it has become post-racial.
Ironically, beliefs in post-racialism might make it easier 
for some types of discrimination claimants to be viewed as 
credible. To the extent that Whites now view Whites as the 
primary targets of discrimination (Norton & Sommers, 
2011), plaintiffs’ counsel might anticipate that these cases 
will be perceived more favorably by legal decision makers, 
and “reverse discrimination” claimants may more easily 
recruit lawyers (Myrick et al., 2012).
Organizational diversity initiatives. Defendants’ lawyers may 
mount a defense highlighting organizational diversity initia-
tives as evidence of nondiscrimination, and this may shape 
plaintiffs’ counsel’s meta-perceptions. Diversity initiatives 
promoting egalitarian values (e.g., pro-diversity mission 
statements, diversity training) are prevalent in U.S. organiza-
tions (Dobbin, 2009). Despite their prevalence, most diver-
sity initiatives do not result in fairer organizational outcomes 
for disadvantaged groups (Kalev, Dobbin, & Kelly, 2006). 
Instead, many diversity initiatives serve only as symbolic 
markers of fairness (Dobbin, 2009). Ironically, however, 
research in law and psychology has observed that diversity 
initiatives, even those that are purely window dressing, 
impede detecting discrimination against members of disad-
vantaged groups (Edelman, Krieger, Eliason, Albiston, & 
Mellema, 2011; Kaiser et al., 2013).
For example, in recent decades, federal judges have 
increasingly displayed deference to organizations’ diversity 
initiatives when deciding employment discrimination cases 
(Edelman et al., 2011). Increasingly, judges conclude that 
merely possessing diversity initiatives makes organizations 
compliant with civil rights laws, without evaluating whether 
these initiatives actually create fairer environments. U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions also reveal judicial deference. In 
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton (1998), the Court absolved 
organizations of responsibility for employees’ meritorious 
charge of sexual harassment when employees are aware of 
an organization’s diversity initiative but do not navigate its 
internal dispute process. Yet, these rulings do not require that 
organizations show that their diversity initiatives are actually 
effective at protecting civil rights.
Psychological science also reveals that people assume 
organizations with diversity initiatives are unlikely to dis-
criminate, even when faced with evidence that discrimina-
tion occurred. Across six experiments (Kaiser et al., 2013), 
the presence (vs. absence) of organizational diversity initia-
tives (e.g., diversity training, diversity mission statement) 
caused advantaged groups (e.g., Whites, men) to become less 
sensitive to discrimination directed at disadvantaged groups 
(racial minorities, women). For example, after seeing women 
disproportionately passed over for promotions in favor of 
equally qualified men, men told that the company offered 
gender-related diversity training were less likely to see dis-
parate treatment against women as stemming from sexism, 
compared with men who did not see evidence of diversity 
training. Sometimes, even disadvantaged groups show these 
same responses to diversity initiatives. For example, women 
are less likely to detect sexism against women when an orga-
nization offers gender-related diversity training, compared 
with when it does not (Brady, Kaiser, Major, & Kirby, 2014; 
see Dover, Major, & Kaiser, 2014, for data on Latinos).
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Studies from law and psychology converge to suggest 
that defense attorneys who introduce evidence that an orga-
nization offers diversity initiatives will inhibit juries and 
judges from detecting discrimination against disadvantaged 
groups. Plaintiffs’ counsel might be constrained by this 
“diversity defense,” making it more difficult to demonstrate 
the merits of their case. In the face of this, plaintiffs’ coun-
sel may decline credible cases involving disadvantaged 
clients.
Structural Barriers
Beyond psychological processes, several structural barriers 
block meaningful redress of potentially meritorious discrimi-
nation claims and dampen their financial viability. Adequate 
compensation is the “fuel that makes the machinery of adju-
dication work. If the fuel runs out, the machinery does not 
function and civil rights do not have the effect of protecting 
people whose interests are at stake” (Civil Rights Act, 1990, 
House Report).
Over recent decades, the U.S. Supreme Court has raised 
substantive, procedural, and fee-recovery barriers that 
dampen the financial viability of representing discrimina-
tion claimants, which Congress has attempted with incom-
plete success to dislodge. In 1975, the Court forbade federal 
courts from exercising equitable powers to provide fee 
awards to prevailing civil rights claimants. One year later, 
Congress responded by enacting a statute authorizing fee 
shifting, the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act. In 
1989 and 1990, the Court issued seven decisions that cur-
tailed Title VII’s private enforcement regime, reshaping 
burdens of proof, standards of evidence, standing, statute of 
limitations, and attorneys’ fees. In turn, Congress responded 
by enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which attempted 
to restore Title VII’s private enforcement regime (Civil 
Rights Act, 1990, House Report; Civil Rights Act, 1990, 
Senate Report). Afterward, the Court imposed severely 
restrictive time periods for claimants to challenge equal pay 
discrimination (Brake & Grossman, 2007), which Congress 
unwound in the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act. Since the 
early 1990s, the Court has also reshaped Title VII’s proof 
structures, narrowing the legal contours of actionable dis-
crimination, harassment, and retaliation (Brake & 
Grossman, 2007; Nelson, Berrey, & Nielsen, 2008). And 
the Court has reinterpreted procedural rules, including 
pleading rules, making Title VII cases more difficult to 
commence (Quintanilla, 2011), while dampening the abil-
ity to redress discrimination on a class-wide basis (Resnik, 
2011), and diminishing the likelihood of collecting attor-
neys’ fees when lawsuits force defendants to voluntarily 
halt discrimination (Albiston & Nielsen, 2006). The cumu-
lative effect of these structural barriers disincentivizes law-
yers from representing victims of discrimination and 
contributes to the access-to-justice problem.
Policy Implications
Our three-stage analysis of obtaining legal representation 
highlights the psychological and structural barriers that pre-
vent employment discrimination claimants from obtaining 
legal representation and scaling the dispute pyramid. 
Surmounting these barriers can strengthen civil rights 
enforcement, providing employment-discrimination victims 
with the meaningful redress promised in Title VII. This final 
section connects psychological science, law, and policy, 
offering suggestions for increasing discrimination claimants’ 
access to counsel.
First, psychological scientists can contribute toward legal 
education by providing guidance on framing arguments in 
ways that increase jurors’ and judges’ receptivity toward evi-
dence that discrimination continues to pose barriers for dis-
advantaged groups. Doing this may help lawyers overcome 
barriers posed by meta-perceptions of judges, juries, and 
defense attorneys that prevent them from taking on discrimi-
nation cases. However, legal education may be insufficient, 
as financial realities constrain representation decisions.
Instead, public interest law can provide a powerful path 
toward overcoming some obstacles to representation high-
lighted here. For example, with increased public funding for 
legal services and to agencies such as the EEOC, public ser-
vice lawyers could accept risky cases. They could introduce 
arguments that overcome the obstacles described, and if suc-
cessful, could provide precedent for other employment dis-
crimination cases. If these cases are successful, private 
lawyers may be more willing to take on subsequent cases, 
providing future victims of employment discrimination with 
the ability to realize the promise of civil rights laws. Funding 
would also enable public interest groups’ efforts to address 
judicial rulings and laws that dismantle Title VII.
Third, legal empiricists can contribute by closely evaluat-
ing the cumulative effect of the Supreme Court’s decisions on 
counsel’s decision to represent claimants. Many recent rulings 
construe federal statutes. As such, if these rulings dismantle 
access to justice, Congress may amend Title VII, attorneys’ 
fees laws, and procedural rules to reconstruct the private 
enforcement scheme. The Court’s decisions comprehensively 
affect the system of private enforcement and need to be evalu-
ated cumulatively for their effect on access to justice.
Fourth, greater diversity within the legal profession can 
contribute toward resolving the access-to-counsel problem. 
If lawyers more broadly represented the backgrounds of 
employment discrimination victims, claimants may have 
more access to lawyers, through networks and community 
organizations, and claimants may feel more comfortable dis-
cussing discrimination with lawyers from similar back-
grounds. And, if a diverse legal profession channels into a 
diverse judiciary, the pluralistic experiences and views of a 
diverse judiciary will broaden inclusive perspectives on jus-
tice and discrimination (Weinberg & Nielsen, 2011).
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Finally, scientists, legal practitioners, and policy makers 
can translate scientifically grounded approaches to managing 
diversity into regulated diversity practices that comply with 
civil rights laws. Indeed, the French Government, for exam-
ple, has recently regulated diversity and equality labels that 
companies can earn if they maintain diversity practices that 
are empirically grounded as effective. These labels are diffi-
cult to earn, requiring substantial oversight, evaluations, and 
regular renewal. Time will tell whether they increase equal 
opportunity. Such an approach would benefit current diver-
sity management, which, although well-intentioned, is often 
ineffective and sometimes harmful (Dobbin, 2009).
By regulating diversity practices and separating those that 
are empirically based from those that are not, juries and judges 
will find it easier to render judgments about whether a “diversity 
defense” is credible. For example, if an organization used 
empirically validated diversity initiatives, and examined their 
organizational data regularly to examine effectiveness and 
adjusted policies accordingly, a “diversity defense” may be a 
reasonable inference. Indeed, organizations may then be moti-
vated to implement best evidence-based diversity practices, as 
the law would recognize their stringent effort to combat bias. 
This approach would also recast as less compelling arguments 
from organizations that use window-dressing diversity 
approaches, making it easier for lawyers to convince juries and 
judges to view non-evidence-based approaches more critically.
Conclusion
The United States has witnessed remarkable progress in 
access to equal opportunity in the 50 years since Title VII 
was signed into law; yet, extensive employment discrimina-
tion persists. Women are still paid less than men for the same 
work, field experiments in the labor market still reveal dis-
crimination against disadvantaged groups, and disadvan-
taged groups lag behind advantaged groups in ascending the 
ranks within organizations (Banaji & Greenwald, 2013; 
Eagly & Carli, 2007). The civil rights promise of Title VII is 
still needed. Today, this promise goes unfulfilled for many 
victims of employment discrimination. Psychological sci-
ence can examine one place where the civil rights process 
goes awry for discrimination claimants: access to counsel. 
By understanding why discrimination claimants, and in par-
ticular, minority claimants, experience difficulty accessing 
legal counsel, psychological scientists, legal scholars, and 
policy makers can work together to enhance access to justice 
and improve the potential of civil rights enforcement.
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